NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island

WHERE ARE YOUR PRINCIPLES?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm there have been volumes written about coalition warfare¹. The writings focus on the great success of the coalition against Iraq, emphasizing the coalition and paying little attention to the warfare. The volumes (including Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter VI) evidence a paucity of references to the principles of war and the lack of any universal doctrine leads the majority of authors to turn key phrases that appear as principles of war or doctrine, such as *unity of effort* or *interoperability*.

There is an effort to describe successful combined operations through some measure of the cooperation achieved by its members or the political correctness of the commanders involved.² This is not new, as General RisCassi points out, "... for the most part our historic perspectives tend to analyze the leaders who led victorious coalitions, as if the secrets of success lay in personalities more than methods. A doctrinal foundation must be based on methods." This is akin to giving Neil Armstrong all the credit for man walking on the moon, ignoring the experts who applied the laws of physics to make it happen. Similarly, success in war is more likely the result of proper application of the principles of war rather than coalition protocol or the political correctness of the commander, however important those traits might be to multinational cooperation.

The myriad of recent articles speaks of coalitions, ad hoc coalitions, multinational operations, allies, treaty partners, etc. This paper will use the definitions provided by LTC

¹ Defining terms is critical. Joint Doctrine will be the primary source. For the purposes of this paper, Combined Operations and Multinational Operations mean the same thing.

² Anderschatt, Richard W. <u>Factors Affecting Success in Coalition Command</u>, US Army War College, 1986. ³RisCassi, Robert W. <u>Principle for Coalition Warfare</u>. Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993. Page 59.

Wayne A. Skillett, in his article *Alliance and Coalition Warfare*, which appears to be taken directly from Joint Publication 3-0. "From a military standpoint, a coalition is an informal agreement for common action between two or more nations. An alliance, on the other hand, is a more formal arrangement for broad long term objectives. In the military vocabulary, both require *combined operations* — meaning operations involving two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies" (emphasis from the original text). Coalitions or ad hoc coalitions have no formal structure and fight multinational warfare, whereas alliances normally have formal structure and fight combined warfare using combined forces and staffs. Both coalitions and alliances fall under the terms combined operations or multinational operations.

Logic and experience dictate that coalitions greatly complicate warfare. Unilateral action provides immense advantage in planning military operations. The nation taking action is able to apply its doctrine and organization without concern for alliance or coalition partners. Attempting to describe the characteristics of successful coalition warfare without mentioning alliance warfare seems to overlook a wealth of experience that may provide the key to combined operations. Is war itself changed by the fact alliances or coalitions are engaged? The same laws of physics apply regardless of who is aboard the space shuttle. Are not the principles of war universally applicable? If we accept them as true principles, by definition they must be.

Logic would again dictate that alliance warfare provides an interim step toward coalition warfare. Figure 1 supports this concept of varying levels of multinational

⁴ Silkett, Wayne A. Alliance and Coalition Warfare. Parameters, Summer 1993. Page 75.

involvement and increasing complexity.




Figure 1. Combined Warfare

This author will establish definitions, briefly discuss the principles of war and their history, look at current US alliances focusing on Korea, provide a scenario for application of key principles of war at the operational level in combined warfare, provide a brief glimpse at the current literature, and conclude with three key principles for success in multinational operations. Due to the limitations of this paper, only the three most important principles of war for combined operations will be discussed in depth, *objective*, *unity of command*, and *simplicity*. The goal of this paper will be to demonstrate the proper application of certain key principles of war, at the operational level, are essential to success in combined warfare using the experiences of the author in the Republic of Korea (ROK) as part of the Combined Forces Command (CFC).

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

In his book, *The Quest for Victory*, John Alger focuses on the principles of war and their history. He notes that over the centuries they have been called, "principles, maxims, theories, rules, or judgments." Regardless of the names, they have been described as

⁵ Alger, John I. <u>The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War</u>, Westport, CT. Greenwood Press, 1982. Page 4.

"fundamental truths pertinent to the practice of war," served as "guides for the effective conduct of war; and they are often used to facilitate the study of military history."⁷ Unfortunately however, there is no universal acceptance of the principles of war nor an accepted list of principles themselves.

Although Alger notes that principles or maxims have existed for centuries, witness the writings of Sun Tzu, it is Carl von Clausewitz who is most closely associated with the principles and given credit for modern analysis of war with his logic based arguments on the question of war being an art or a science. "Clausewitz enunciated 4 'rules': to employ all available forces with utmost energy; concentration at the point where the decisive blow is to be struck; to lose no time and surprise the enemy; and to follow up success with utmost energy. He also enunciated 3 general principles for the defence, 14 for offence, 8 for troops and 17 for use of terrain." Compare this long list of Clausewitz to Jomini, who proposed "but 2 principles of war: to use freedom of manoeuvre (sic) to bring masses of one's own troops against fractions of the enemy's, and to strike in the most decisive direction." This obvious mismatch of universal agreement is further documented on Table 1 below. This reflects the principles as enunciated by Jomini, Clausewitz, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, and Admiral Nimitz, as well as those accepted by the British Field Service Regulation (FSR), US Joint Doctrine, and the armed forces of the ROK. Clearly there are commonalties among the principles of the various nations, but no specific list is applicable to all.

⁶ Ibid. Page 4.

⁷ Ibid. Page xviii.

⁸ Bellamy, Christopher D. The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice, NY, NY, Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc., 1990. Page 13.

⁹ Ibid. Page 13.

TABLE 1. PRINCIPLES OF WAR¹⁰

Jomini	Clausewitz	Fuller	Nimitz	British FSR	US Joint	ROK ¹¹
Use freedom of manoeuvre to bring masses against fractions	Employ all available forces with utmost energy	Mental (a) Direction	Objective	Mainteneance of the aim	Objective	Objective
Decisive direction	Concentrate where decisive blow is to be struck	(b) Concentration	Offensive	Offensive action	Offensive	Offensive
	Lose no time and surprise enemy	(c) Distribution	Surprise	Concentration	Mass	Mass
	Pursue success with utmost energy	2. Moral (a) Determination	Superiority at the point of contact	Economy of Force	Economy of Force	Maneuver
		(b) surprise	Simplicity	Co-operation	Maneuver	Surprise
		(c) Endurance	Security	Security	Unity of Command	Security
		3. Physical (a) Mobility	Movement	Surprise	Security	Intelligence
		(b) Offensive action	Economy of Force	Mobility	Surprise	Unity
		(c) Security	Cooperation		Simplicity	Creativity Morale Simplicity


Needing to establish a fixed set of principles for the purpose of discussion, this paper will use the principles of war, reiterated below, as found in US Joint Doctrine, Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix A.¹²

> Objective Offensive Mass Economy of Force Maneuver Unity of Command Security Surprise Simplicity

 ¹⁰ Ibid. Page 14.
 ¹¹ ROK Army FM 100-5 dated 31 July 1996, Translated courtesy Combat Support Coordination Team #3, Third ROK Army Headquarters, Yongin Republic of Korea.

12 Joint Pub 3-0, Appendix A.

CFC Command and Control



The focus of this effort will be on the three principles of war most critical to the success of combined operations. Since the US-ROK alliance provides the basis for application of the key principles identified, the alliance itself deserves discussion.


COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and our relationship with the ROK stand as the two most visible commitments the US has for military alliances. Both NATO and our commitment to the ROK reflect the characteristics of alliance operations as defined in Joint Publication 3-0. "Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the alliance force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands are often led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances." ¹³

NATO, with its many member states, is far more complex in structure and diversity than the US-ROK alliance. As such, the US-ROK CFC provides a vehicle for examining the application of key principles of war in combined operations. Figure 1 in Appendix A and the facing page depicts the command structure for the US-ROK CFC. This paper will further focus on the operational level by examining the Combined Aviation Force (CAF), which provides the CFC Ground Component Commander (GCC) with theater army aviation assets.

The concept for the CAF was first proposed in 1982 and a memorandum of agreement was signed in 1988. The CAF is a major subordinate command within the GCC.

The CAF is commanded by the ROK Army Aviation Commander (Major General). The



MAP 2

From: Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951 Center of Military History, 1990 By Billy C. Mossman

CAF Deputy Commander (Colonel) is the commander of the 17th Aviation Brigade (AVN BDE), a major subordinate command in Eighth United States Army (EUSA) and part of United States Forces Korea (USFK). 17th AVN BDE provides theater level army aviation support to US forces throughout the ROK. The organization of the CAF dictates a completely combined US-ROK staff.

The CAF includes all non-divisional army aviation, both US and ROK, available for support to CFC. As currently configured the CAF has over 4,000 personnel assigned, approximately 1,500 US and the balance ROK troops. Aircraft number over three-hundred, including 48 AH-64's, 75 AH-1's, 40 500MD's, 19 UH-1's, 84 UH-60's, and 50 CH-47's. Specific organization and further detail on the CAF can be found in Appendix B.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

Prior to analysis of the application of key principles of war in the planning and execution of an operation by the CAF, history provides a very likely scenario. As General Douglas MacArthur returned from Wake Island he directed his staff to begin planning for the total defeat of North Korea and the end of the war. The invasion at Inchon had unhinged the North Korean offensive and by mid October 1950 it was a race to Pyongyang. MacArthur alerted the 187th Airborne (ABN) Regimental Combat Team (RCT) for an airborne assault north of Pyongyang. The jump would be conducted in the vicinity of the towns of Sukchon and Sunchon which are located astride the main roads out of the capital to the north.

MacArthur's objective was to stop the enemy withdrawals to the north, to cut off enemy reinforcements and to disrupt enemy communications. He hoped to capture important North

¹³ Joint Publication 3-0. Page VI-6.

Korean officials as they fled north and to rescue United Nations (UN) Prisoners of War (POWs) before they could be transported across the Chongchong River, halfway between Pyongyang and the Yalu. 14

The 187th ABN RCT jumped on 20 October and met with limited success. The crumbling enemy was retreating at break neck speed and although the operation achieved its limited objectives, it failed to capture political officials of any consequence nor prevent the dislocation of the UN POWs. The 187th ABN RCT assault was a unilateral operation conducted by US forces in Korea. In any future conflict on the Korean Peninsula it is evident that it will be combined in nature from the outset.


An attack from the north will be halted at some point south of the current DMZ and then US-ROK forces will bring the war to the enemy. This author envisions an aggressive combined offensive with the strategic goal of unifying the peninsula. A well coordinated offensive will present a similar challenge to CFC, secure decisive points north of Pyongyang to stop enemy withdrawals, to cut off enemy reinforcements, and disrupt enemy communications.

APPLICATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Instead of an airborne assault on decisive points north of Pyongyang it is much more likely CFC will employ an air assault with ROK ground forces supported by the CAF. This scenario will demonstrate the application of three key principles of war in a combined operation. Prior to the outbreak of war, the command structure itself provides application of two of the three key principles of war, *objective* and *unity of command*.

¹⁴ Stokesbury, James L. <u>A Short History of the Korean War</u>. New York, NY William Morrow and Co., 1988, Page 90.

CFC Command and Control



The command and control structure reflected on the facing page provides the melding of US and ROK national goals into a unified strategy for CFC. This provides the commander of CFC with one set of priorities allowing him to focus on a single *objective*. The unique command and control relationship of CFC also provides a *unity of command* that is unmatched in any other alliance. The existence of a truly combined staff provides a great depth to this bilateral commitment. The relationships and trust that has formed from decades of such a relationship has forged a strong tradition of cooperation and credibility to this combined command and staff structure in the ROK.

The depth of the ROK confidence in the US commitment to the Republic is further enhanced by the Korean Augmentee to the United States Army (KATUSA). This program is an outgrowth of the Korean War when the ROK provided young men directly to the US Army for combat, combat support, or even as laborers. Since the war it has evolved into a formal program where young men are drafted into the ROK Army but serve their period of enlistment in a US unit after ROK basic training. US Battalions and Squadrons normally have as many as fifty to seventy young Korean soldiers living, working, and socializing with US soldiers. The KATUSAs, who remain in US units for over two years (as opposed to one for most US soldiers) are selected for their English ability and are normally sophomores or juniors in college. The program provides critical language skills to a US unit and provides a cultural link to the Korean population that would otherwise not exist. KATUSAs are assigned to all US units in the CAF. Additionally, each brigade staff and higher has a ROK liaison officer and senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) assigned to assist with translation and coordination in combined operations.

The US provides its own liaison elements called Combat Support Coordination

Teams (CSCT) at the ROK Army level. Each of the three ROK Army staffs has this group of officers and NCOs assigned to assist in sharing doctrine and expertise across the spectrum of combat functions. The CSCT may be as small as thirty or as large as eighty. These soldiers work and live as a part of their associated ROK Army Headquarters. This channel is particularly valuable in sharing intelligence and disseminating information

At the operational level, the CAF (the theater level army aviation element), is structured to maximize the same key principles of *objective* and *unity of command*. As a major subordinate command under the GCC, the CAF has one set of priorities. The mission is directed by GCC and there is only one commander. The combined structure of the CAF staff mirrors that of CFC itself, with all US staff sections benefiting from the presence of KATUSAs to assist in language and culture. The regular training on a wide variety of CAF missions such as deep attack, anti-armor, air assault, air movement, command and control and combat service support strengthen the credibility of this force to accomplish any assigned mission.

The final key principle of war essential for the success of combined operations is *simplicity*. As close as our training and doctrine may be with the ROK, language and culture provide obstacles that may be invisible to the planner or the commander. A plan executed in a combined environment must be simple and a rehearsal is a must to insure there is no confusion. This author has spent countless hours in the planning and execution of battalion size air assault operations with ROK ground forces acting as the air mission commander for a combined aviation task force at the tactical level. Participating in operational level planning for AH-64 deep attacks and in major exercises (Team Spirit, Ulchi Focus Lens, Foal Eagle,

and others) lead this author to the following conclusions. The three key principles of war critical to success at the tactical level are exactly the same at the operational level and the keys to a successful combined air assault operation are a clear chain of command, a simple plan that is well rehearsed and effective liaison at the critical point, normally the pickup zone (PZ).

FOCUS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The many articles written about multinational operations, normally highlighting coalition warfare, rarely speak of principles of war. Why do authors avoid basing their analysis on these time tested principles of war and opt for terms of reference and principles more aligned with diplomacy and international relations? In all cases it appears the coalition becomes the center of focus and not the war. Recommended considerations or suggestions for effective coalition operations deal more with the relationship between coalition members than the relationship with the enemy. Principles of war address not only certain characteristics of our own forces and force structure but also speak to placing ourselves at some advantage in respect to the enemy. The latter use of the principles of war is missing from current popular discussion concerning combined warfare.

Colonel Richard Anderschat's effort to describe Factors Affecting Success in Coalition Operations, written in 1986 (before coalition warfare was a popular topic), reaches the following conclusions: "Consummate professional skill, ingenuity, capacity for broad thought, knowledge of national and alliance policy matters, persuasive ability, legitimacy of position, diplomacy, tact and sensitivity to national issues, and the need for leverage were found to be important factors. Lastly it was determined that strong positive, agreeable

personality was probably the most important factor contributing to success in coalition or combined command."¹⁵

This conclusion is based on a study of W.W.II and coalitions commanded by Generals Mark Clark, Jacob L. Devers, and Joseph W. Stilwell. It would appear that the principles of war and their application were of minimal importance and not worthy of mention. The principles of war receive better treatment from Captain Terry J. Pudas in his article, *Preparing Future Coalition Commanders*, where he states unity of command and simplicity as two important elements in combined operations. Unfortunately, he backs away from strong support of the principles of war in his conclusion by revealing "four enduring principles." These include unity of purpose, unity of effort, interoperability, and minimizing and preventing risks to personnel. 17

Major General Waldo Freeman (US Army), Commander Randell J. Hess (US Navy) and Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Faria (Portuguese Army) provide a NATO perspective on this subject in their paper, *The Challenges of Combined Operations*. At the outset these authors note "... leadership – political and military – should agree on common objectives, strategy and command arrangements, ideally achieving unity of command." This quote recognizes the principles of objective and unity of command without providing a direct reference to them as such, but then the paper quickly dilutes the principles of war and goes on to address unity of effort and collegial leadership, no longer recognizable as principles of war. At one point in the paper, nine areas are identified as key to the operational level of combined warfare: Goals, Doctrine, Intelligence, Language, Training, Equipment, Logistics,

¹⁵ Anderschatt, Richard W. Factors Affecting Success in Coalition Command. US Army War College, Page ii

¹⁶ Pudas, Terry J. <u>Preparing Future Coalition Commanders</u>. Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, Page 45 ¹⁷ Ibid. Page 45

Cultures, and Sensitivities.¹⁹ Once again, focus is placed on keeping the coalition together or strengthening the coalition itself rather than on the coalition achieving some advantage over the enemy.

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A Silkett's article, *Alliance and Coalition Warfare*, provides a very similar summary. His opening salvo is a strong call for unity of command. Then as he writes further, he weakens his support for unity of command recognizing authority may be "collegial" rather than coercive. His list of areas that demand attention include: Goals, Training, Capabilities, Equipment, Logistics, Culture, Doctrine, Intelligence and Language. In his conclusion, he states, "Successful coalition partners, particularly coalition leaders, will be those who best handle operational realities by applying the proper blend of vision, determination, patience, tolerance, and flexibility." What happened to the principles of war?

Colonel Anthony J. Rice (United Kingdom) claims to strike at the heart of multinational operations in his paper, Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare. Colonel Rice notes the absence of the principle of war, unity of command, from US joint and single service doctrine for coalition warfare and the use of unity of effort instead. He provides an analysis of historical command and control relationships from W.W.I, W.W.II, Korea, Vietnam, and the recent conflict in the Gulf. He also resurrects unity of purpose, a coalition phrase representing a diluted form of objective. His comments on Joint Publication 3-0 are particularly apropos, "... in its section on multinational operations, discusses at some length the concept of unity of effort, but does not even mention unity of

¹⁸ Freeman, Waldo. <u>The Challenges of Combined Operations</u>. Military Review, Nov. 1992, Page 4.

¹⁹ Ibid. Pages 6-10.

²⁰ Silkett Wayne A. Alliance and Coalition Warfare. Parameters, Summer 1993, Page 83.

command, despite the latter being a US principle of war."²¹ He later cuts to the heart of the issue with the following quote: "Hard-won experience indicates the importance of unity of command in a coalition operation" and "Has US doctrine dismissed too quickly the principle of unity of command at the theater level in multinational operations in favor of the less demanding, but higher risk, unity of effort?"²² This author echoes Colonel Rice's comments when he states in his conclusion, "Regrettably, Operation Desert Storm has assumed a position of role model that it ill deserves."²³

John Alger's book provides a look at the principles and how they have changed over the centuries. The use of terms such as unity of effort is not something new. Unity of effort appeared as a principle of war in the 1939 US Army Field Service Regulation (FSR), which was the first printing of Field Manual (FM) 100-5.²⁴ Unity of purpose was also noted as a principle of war at one time by Major H. Franois (France) following W.W.I in a French journal article.²⁵

Concern about confusion surrounding the principles of war is well founded. Martha Maurer writes about *Coalition Command and Control* for the National Defense University. Maurer notes this phrase "unity of effort" appears in Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Armed Forces Action (UNAAF) with one definition and then again in a RAND study on Command and Control of Joint Air Operations with another definition. The latter claiming *unity of command* is one of the several necessary steps to achieve "unity of effort". Then Maurer goes on to discuss unity of effort as if it were a recognized principle of war.

Rice Anthony J. <u>Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare</u>. Parameters, Spring '97, Page 163.
 Ibid. Page 164.

²³ Ibid. Page 166.

²⁴ Alger John I. <u>The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War</u>. Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, Page 144.

The principles of war provide the basis for General RisCassi's article Principles for Coalition Warfare. He seeks a military doctrine that ensures success of military operations, not an etiquette handbook for combined staffs. He maintains his perspective using the principles of war throughout his piece. Statements such as, "... military principles serve as a point of reference when organizing the coalition and establishing command relations" and "principles are vital means to think about war" provide solid ground for his analysis.26 General RisCassi emphasizes objective with this quote: "agreement on strategy is the foundation of coalition action." He writes further, "Unity of command is the most fundamental principle of warfare, the single most difficult to gain in combined warfare."27 He addresses planning, training, integration, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and logistics, language and culture but does not give up the basic application of principles of war to achieve coalition success in war. General RisCassi, with his last assignment as Commander CFC, USFK and EUSA, provides a great deal of experience in combined operations to this discussion. His efforts in strengthening the US-ROK alliance continued to sustain the tenuous armistice on the peninsula. However, our intelligence experts indicate the situation on the Korean Peninsula will not likely remain the same for another 50 years. Economics may provide the spark that ignites the Second Korean War.


SCENARIO: AIR ASSAULT

In the face of a starving population and certain economic ruin, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) strikes out to seize Seoul and strengthen its negotiating position prior to the peace talks beginning next month. CFC has halted the advance of North

²⁷ Ibid. Pages 63-67.

²⁵ Ibid. Page 128

²⁶ RisCassi Robert W. Principles for Coalition Warfare. Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1993, Page 62.



MAP 2

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Korean ground forces and reinforcements from the US are being integrated into the planned counter-offensive. Continued attacks from the air have greatly weakened an already struggling logistics effort on the part of the North Korean army. The national economy of the DPRK is in no shape to fight a protracted conflict. The last communist bastion of the cold war is about to crumble.

In conjunction with a major ground attack, the commander of CFC plans to direct a brigade size air assault to secure decisive points north of Pyongyang to stop enemy withdrawals; to cut off enemy reinforcements; and to disrupt enemy communications.

Additionally, CFC hopes to capture important North Korean officials as they flee the capital. CFC provides an alert order to GCC. In turn, GCC alerts the selected subordinate units including the CAF.

Immediately the CAF combined staff begins the backward planning process with the staff of the ROK division that will provide command and control for the brigade executing the air assault. First priority is establishing the appropriate command and control relationships and identifying the air assault task force commander (Division commander), the ground commander (Brigade commander) and the air mission commander (CAF Group commander). The CAF staff will task the units, both US and ROK, that will support the operation. Early in the process a clear chain of command is established employing the principle of *unity of command*. These relationships have been practiced during CAF training and are well understood, commanders knowing each other and the capabilities and limitations of participating units.

The principle of *objective*, provided by the directive from CFC through GCC, is reinforced by the overall mission commander as he refines his mission statement and

commander's intent. Practiced over and over again during the long 50 years of armistice, the staffs work through the planning process toward a simple plan that will meet the requirements of the commander's intent and overall success of the mission.

Simplicity in mission planning can include selecting appropriate control measures and check points that are easily recognizable from the air, clarifying reporting requirements and frequencies by providing execution checklists and matrix's to all crews and leaders, organization of the PZ and landing zone (LZ), exchanging liaison teams, use of bilingual pathfinders, exchanging overlays of objectives, targets, routing, etc. Key to the success of a mission of this type will be a thorough rehearsal with each unit. This means a rehearsal within the task force to practice key tasks, such as loading and unloading aircraft, PZ or LZ operations and then a full up rehearsal exercising all units involved.

The application of these three key principles of war, *objective*, *unity of command*, and *simplicity*, recommended for any military operation, are particularly critical to success for combined warfare at the operational level.

CONCLUSION

US Joint doctrine recognizes the nine principles of war listed in Appendix A of Joint Publication 3-0. These principles are applicable to all military operations including combined warfare, both coalition and alliance. In Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter VI, doctrine is to quick to distance itself from these crucial principles in the name of multinational cooperation. Great care should be taken before we dilute our principles and see unity of effort, interoperability, and unity of purpose sneaking into doctrine. An argument can be made that if coalition warfare is a future reality our list of principles of war should be

reevaluated in that light. However, until Appendix A is changed, US Doctrine should remain true to the principles as they now appear.

The scientific method teaches that understanding a complex arrangement is a process of controlling variables and experimentation. Hypotheses can be tested and truths or laws established to describe the interaction of elements. The same should hold true for an examination of war. Careful study of our alliance experience in the ROK and NATO will provide a wealth of data for application in coalition operations. Attempts to define success from our experience in Desert Storm approaches the issue of coalition operations from the wrong end.

This author's limited research and experience in executing operational level warfare as part of the CAF underscores three key principles of war that are essential to success in combined operations. The three key principles of war are *unity of command*, *objective* and *simplicity*. Extrapolating from successful unilateral and alliance warfare to the more complex coalition warfare requires even closer adherence to the precepts of the principles of war. Application of new principles, alternative principles, or virtual principles dilutes the very basis of our own doctrine.

As NASA moves closer to realizing success in building an international space station, it has not proclaimed new laws of physics nor diluted the basic principles it used over the decades to achieve success in space. NASA has accommodated their international partners in other ways, using the same laws and principles of physics they have always used. In the same way, US Joint Doctrine must remain well grounded on the principles of war. Only through the proper application of the principles of war will combined forces secure victory today, tomorrow and into the future.

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
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APPENDIX A

CFC COMMAND and CONTROL

CFC Command and Control




Command without Operational Control – Operational Control for Counter-Infiltration

APPENDIX B

COMBINED AVIATION FORCE



COMBINED AVIATION FORCE





CAF BACKGROUND



1982 - CONCEPT PROPOSED

1984 - TESTED AND EVALUATED PROPOSED MOA

1986 - 1987 MOA REFINED

1988 - MOA SIGNED

1990 - MOA REVISED/UPDATED

1993 - MOA UPDATED

CAF _____



PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION



CAF IS GCC MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND

ROK AVN CMD CDR (MG) IS CAF CDR

17TH AVN BDE CDR IS CAF DEPUTY CDR


COMBINED ROK/US STAFF

CAF _____



COMBINED AVIATION FORCE ORGANIZATION









CAF EMPLOYMENT

CAF CENTRALLY CONTROLLED BY GCC

MISSION TASK ORGANIZATION

DECENTRALIZED MISSION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

CINC DIRECTED DEEP ATTACK

CAF.



PERSONNEL



UNIT	REQUIRED	AUTHORIZED
ROK AVN CMD	2968	2521
17TH AVN BDE	1719	1586
CAF	4687	4107

CAF ____



AIRCRAFT



	Γ	T	Т
TYPE	US	ROK	TOTAL
AH-64	36		36
AH-1		75	75
500MD		40	40
OH-58	26		26
UH-1	2	17	19
UH-60	36	48	84
CH-47	32	18	50
TOTAL	132	198	330

CAF _____





MISSION/FUNCTION

TO CONDUCT COMBINED ROK/US AVIATION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF GCC

MISSIONS:

ANTI-ARMOR
AIR ASSAULT
RECON AND SECURITY
COMMAND AND CONTROL
EVACUATION
AIR MOVEMENT
CSS

CAF ___



COMBINED TRAINING



LIAISON AND OBSERVER / CONTROLLER EXCHANGES

OPLAN REHEARSALS

MAIN AND TACTICAL CP DISPLACEMENT

BASE DEFENSE

SENIOR LEVEL OPD BRIEFING ON COMBINED AVIATION

EMPLOYMENT

STAFF TRAINING AND SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES

COMBINED SEMI-ANNUAL TRAINING BRIEFING

EXPANDED AAT / JAAT OPPORTUNITIES

COMBINED EXTERNAL EVALUATION

~	Α.	r

